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ESTATES AND TRUSTS-INTER VIvoS GIFTS-MENTAL COMPE-
TENCE-UNDUE INFLUENCE-CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP-The
burden of proof is initially on the donor to overcome the presump-
tion of mental competence of the donor.
Moser v DeSetta, 589 A2d 679, 527 Pa 157 (1991).
John, Jr. and Ann Moser had been married for thirty-seven
years and were living together when, in March of 1985, Mr. Moser
was diagnosed by his personal physician as being afflicted with cer-
ebral arteriosclerosis.1 The physician who diagnosed Mr. Moser
stated that the disease had manifested itself through confusion,
memory loss and other symptoms of senility.2
Helen DeSetta, Mr. Moser's sister, was visiting the family in
early August of 1985.1 During DeSettas visit, Mr. Moser expressed
to her that he wanted to use his joint marital savings to start a new
business.4 In late August, DeSetta accompanied Mr. Moser on a
visit to DeSetta's attorney to discuss divorce laws and powers of
attorney.5 On a subsequent visit in late August, Mr. Moser, again
accompanied by DeSetta, executed a power of attorney giving
DeSetta authority to manage her brother's affairs.'
On September 4, 1985, DeSetta took Mr. Moser to his bank and
assisted in placing Mr. and Mrs. Moser's joint marital funds into
treasury bills registered jointly in the name of Mr. and Mrs.
1. Moser v DeSetta, 527 Pa 157, 589 A2d 679, 680 (1991). Cerebral arteriosclerosis is
a thickening and loss of elasticity of the arterial walls (hardening of the arteries) of the
brain. The Sloan-Dorland Annotated Medical-Legal Dictionary 60 (West, 1987).
2. Moser, 589 A2d at 680. The other symptoms of senility manifested themselves
through Mr. Moser's failure to recognize his wife and his surroundings. Id. He also did not
know his name, age, nor the time or date. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. Mr. and Mrs. Moser had life-time savings of approximately $115,000. Id.
DeSetta testified that she discouraged Mr. Moser from pursuing a new business venture
with his savings. Id.
5. Id. Although divorce was discussed, Mr. Moser concluded that he did not have
grounds to pursue that action. Id. "Power of attorney" constitutes "an instrument authoriz-
ing another to act as one's agent or attorney." Black's Law Dictionary 1055 (West, 5th ed
1979).
6. Moser, 589 A2d at 680. The attorney was of the opinion that on the day Mr.
Moser signed this document, he had no difficulty understanding what was said about the
divorce laws and power of attorney. Id. The record also indicated that Mr. Moser was devel-
oping an increasing trust in his sister, DeSetta. Id.
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Moser.7 Several days later, DeSetta assisted Mr. Moser to move
into the home of Mr. Moser's other sister, Ethel Moser."
On September 16, 1985, DeSetta took Mr. Moser to the bank to
meet Mrs. Moser.9 Mr. Moser and his wife executed certain docu-
ments which transferred their funds, approximately $115,000, into
a checking account bearing the names of Mr. Moser and his sister
Ethel Moser. 10 Mr. Moser acted of his own accord.1 The power of
attorney was not exercised by DeSetta with respect to this
transaction.
12
On October 10, 1985, Mr. Moser was taken to the hospital emer-
gency room where he was examined by the same physician who
had previously diagnosed his cerebral arteriosclerosis. 13 At the
trial, this physician testified that he was of the opinion that Mr.
Moser would not have been capable of overseeing his own money
or property during the interval between the original diagnosis in
March of 1985, and the emergency room visit in October of 1985.14
Mr. and Mrs. Moser entered into a consent order 5 on November 1,
1985, requiring Mr. Moser, through his attorney-in-fact DeSetta, to
pay Mrs. Moser one-half of the balance of the checking account
valued as of the time it had been transferred into Mr. Moser and
Ethel Moser's names. 16 Subsequent to this action, Mr. Moser
7. Id.
8. Id. No reason was given for Mr. Moser's move. However, Justice Larsen intimated
in his dissent that it appeared more than coincidental that the timing coincided with
DeSetta's arrival. Id at 685. This is the home where DeSetta also stayed during her visit.
DeSetta was permanently domiciled in the state of Florida. Id.
9. Id at 680. This meeting took place at the Gallatin Bank in the presence of bank
employees. Id.
10. Id. There was contradictory evidence in the record with regard to Mrs. Moser's
understanding of the personal consequence involved in this transaction. Id at 683. Mr.
Moser's mental competency on the date of this transaction becomes the focal point on re-
view by the supreme court. Id.
11. Id at 680.
12. Id.
13. Id. Mr. Moser was taken to the hospital because he was complaining of a stomach
problem. Id.
14. Id at 681. The physician examined Mr. Moser and based his opinion on the fact
that Mr. Moser was disoriented and suffering from memory loss. Id. Mr. Moser did not
remember his age or the nature of the problem for which he was taken to the hospital. Id.
The medical opinion was further based on the irreversibility of cerebral arteriosclerosis. Id.
15. Id. A consent order is entered into by agreement of the parties through a court.
The order can only be modified or vacated by an order of the court. 60 CJS Motions &
Orders § 62(5) (1969). This consent order was entered into to provide Mrs. Moser with
financial support due to Mr. Moser's desire to divorce her. Mr. Moser decided not to pursue
a divorce action following a meeting with DeSetta's attorney. Moser, 589 A2d at 681.
16. Moser, 589 A2d at 681. The balance in the checking account at the time of the
September 16, 1985, transfer was approximately $116,000. Id. The amount transferred to
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amended his pension benefits and his life insurance policies to des-
ignate DeSetta as beneficiary. 17
Mr. Moser died on January 13, 1986.18 Ownership of the joint
account held by Mr. Moser and his sister, Ethel, passed to her by
operation of law.'9 Shortly thereafter, the checking account was
amended by Ethel, transferring ownership, jointly, to herself and
DeSetta2 In 1986 Mrs. Moser instituted an action in equity,2'
seeking to set aside the transfer of funds that had occurred at the
bank on September 16, 1985.22 The court of common pleas upheld
the validity of the transfer of the bank account.2 The court found
no evidence of undue influence,24 nor had Mrs. Moser's claim of
fraud25 been established.2  The trial court concluded that Mr.
Moser was mentally competent 27 on the date that he had executed
Mrs. Moser in satisfaction of the consent decree was $58,000. An additional provision of the
consent order provided that Mrs. Moser would release Mr. Moser from all duties of mainte-
nance and support. Id.
17. Id at 685. The validity of the amendments to these documents were not ques-
tioned at trial nor addressed by the court. Id.
18. Id at 681. Mr. Moser died of pneumonia approximately two months after being
transferred to a nursing home. Id.
19. Id. Survivorship is the main characteristic of a joint tenancy. This means that the
survivor, upon the death of one of the joint tenants, owns the entire property with nothing
passing to the decedent's heirs. Ralph E. Boyer, Survey of the Law of Property 81 (West, 3d
ed 1981).
20. Moser, 589 A2d at 685.
21. An equitable action seeks equitable remedy or relief. In most states, court actions
in equity have been merged procedurally with civil actions. Black's Law Dictionary 482
(West, 5th ed 1979).
22. Moser, 589 A2d at 681. By setting aside the transfer, Mrs. Moser hoped to regain
an interest in Mr. Moser's funds. Id.
23. Moser v DeSetta, No 105 (Pa Coin P1, Fayette Cty 1986).
24. Undue influence is:
Any improper or wrongful constraint, machination, or urgency of persuasion whereby
the will of a person is overpowered and he is induced to do or forebear an act which
he would not do if left to act freely. . . . Misuse of position of confidence or taking
advantage of a person's weakness, infirmity, or distress to change that person's ac-
tions or decisions. ...
Black's Law Dictionary 1370 (West, 5th ed 1979).
25. Fraud is:
An intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of inducing another in reliance on
it to part with some valuable thing belonging to him or to surrender a legal right. A
false representation of a matter of fact, which by words or by conduct, by false or
misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which deceives and is intended to
deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury. ..
Black's Law Dictionary 594 (West, 5th ed 1979).
26. Moser, 589 A2d at 683.
27. Mental competence is defined as:
The ability to understand the nature and effect of the act in which a person is en-
gaged and the business he or she is transacting. Such a measure of intelligence, un-
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the power of attorney, but made no determination as to his mental
competency on the date of the bank transaction in question.28 On
appeal, the superior court affirmed the lower court's decision. 29
Mrs. Moser appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court which
heard the appeal by allowance.30
The supreme court stated that the scope of appellate review in a
case such as this was quite limited. 1 The court noted that in mat-
ters of equity, appellate review was limited to a determination of
whether the trial judge had abused her discretion or committed an
error of law.32 An appellate court will not disturb a final decree in
equity unless the decree was unsubstantiated by the evidence or
demonstrably capricious.3 3 The test the supreme court used was
not whether the appellate court would have reached the same re-
sult as the trial court, but whether, given due consideration of the
evidence, a judicial mind could have reasonably reached the same
conclusion as the trial judge. 4
The court concluded, despite Mrs. Moser's claim to the contrary,
that DeSetta did not abuse an alleged confidential relationship
derstanding, memory, and judgment relative to a particular transaction as will enable
the person to understand the nature of his act .
Black's Law Dictionary 889 (West, 5th ed 1979).
28. Moser, 589 A2d at 684. On appeal, the supreme court concluded that the critical
date for determining mental competency was September 16, 1985, the date of the bank
transaction. Id.
29. Moser v DeSetta, 392 Pa Super 660, 564 A2d 267 (1989). This was a memoran-
dum opinion. The appeal to the superior court was permitted pursuant to Judiciary and
Judicial Proceeding, 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 742 (Purdon 1981).
30. Moser, 589 A2d at 679. The appeal to the supreme court was permitted pursuant
to Judiciary and Judicial Proceeding, 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 501 (Purdon 1981). Appeals by
allowance are governed by 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1112 (Purdon 1976). An appeal by allow-
ance is synonymous with allocatur, which is defined as "a word formerly used to denote that
a writ or order was allowed. A word denoting the allowance by a master or prothonotary of a
bill referred for his consideration .. " Black's Law Dictionary 75 (West, 6th ed 1990).
31. Moser, 589 A2d at 681. Final decrees in equity will not easily be disturbed. Sack v
Feinman, 489 Pa 152, 413 A2d 1059, 1066 (1980).
32. Sack, 413 A2d at 1066. It has long been recognized that the trial judge has the
power to shape and render a decree which fits with the equities of the case. Id.
33. Id.
34. Moser, 589 A2d at 681. The court cited Masciantonio Will, 392 Pa 362, 141 A2d
362, 365 (1958), in which the supreme court reversed a trial court's equitable decision, stat-
ing that the trial court erred by misapplication of a well-established legal principle. Mas-
ciantonio, 141 A2d at 375.. In Masciantonio, the trial court refused to give due consideration
to the testator's competence immediately prior to and subsequent to the execution of his
will. Id at 373. The testimony of the two physicians who treated the decedent within hours
of the execution of his will was not given adequate weight. Id at 372. The trial court failed
to follow the well-recognized rule that attending physician's testimony be given weight as
factual evidence, not solely as lightly weighted opinion testimony. Id at 375.
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with Mr. Moser by receiving from him a substantial benefit
through undue influence.15 DeSetta's receipt of an interest in the
bank account was held not to be the result of undue influence.3 6
DeSetta did not obtain any interest in Mr. Moser's bank account
until after Mr. Moser's death, nor was there any evidence in the
record that DeSetta acted pursuant to any understanding that the
funds in the account would be transferred to her after Mr. Moser's
death.37 The court further stated that no evidence of undue influ-
ence was shown and that only mere speculation could lead to a
finding of undue influence.3 s
Mrs. Moser further claimed that she had been fraudulently in-
duced by DeSetta to participate in the transfer of funds to Mr.
Moser and Ethel Moser.3 9 The court stated that this claim was also
unsubstantiated.4 The trial court correctly ruled that fraud had
not been established. 41 Based upon earlier cases, the court set forth
the necessary elements for proof of fraud.42 In addition to the more
apparent outward manifestations of direct falsehoods by speech or
innuendo, citing earlier case law the court held that fraud can also
consist of concealment of fact.43 Continuing, the court referred to
the trial court record of Mrs. Moser's own testimony, finding there
was no indication that Mrs. Moser might have been deceived or
misled.44
35. Moser, 589 A2d at 681.
36. Id.
37. Id. Justice Larsen's dissent in this case disagrees with this finding. He bases his
dissent, however, on other factors. Id at 684-85.
38. Id at 681.
39. Id at 682. The court's opinion includes the partial testimony of Mrs. Moser and
DeSetta. DeSetta testified, "The people at the bank explained to [Mrs. Moser], that she is
signing over her share.. . . I even said to her, Ann, you don't have to do it." Mrs. Moser's
convoluted testimony indicated a degree of confusion. Id.
40. Id. The court cited Frowen v Blank, 493 Pa 137, 425 A2d 412, 415 (1981), and
stated: "It is well established that fraud consists of anything calculated to deceive, which by
a single act or combination or by suppression of truth or suggestion of what is false, whether
it be by direct falsehood or by innuendo, by speech or silence, word of mouth or look or
gesture." Moser, 589 A2d at 682.
41. Moser, 589 A2d at 682.
42. Id. The court cited Thomas v Seaman, 451 Pa 347, 304 A2d 134, 137 (1973), in
which the supreme court held that "fraud is composed of a misrepresentation fraudulently
uttered with the intent to induce the action undertaken in reliance upon it, to the damage
of its victim." Moser, 589 A2d at 682.
43. Moser, 589 A2d at 682. In citing Commonwealth v Monumental Properties, Inc.,
459 Pa 450, 329 A2d 812, 829 (1974), the court determined that the concealment of a mate-
rial fact can constitute a culpable misrepresentation to the same extent as an intentional
false statement. Moser, 589 A2d at 682.
44. Moser, 589 A2d at 682. The court concluded that Mrs. Moser may have been
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On review, the court stated that, at most, Mrs. Moser may not
have entirely understood the full effect of the transaction at the
bank on September 16, 1985.41 Evidence indicated that DeSetta
had fully explained the transaction to Mrs. Moser.46 The court
noted that a party alleging fraud must bear the burden of proving
fraud by clear and convincing evidence.41 The court concluded that
Mrs. Moser had failed to meet her burden of proof; therefore, the
claim of fraud was unsubstantiated.48
Mrs. Moser further alleged that her husband had lacked the
mental capacity to make a gift of his savings to Ethel Moser on
September 16, 1985.49 Mrs. Moser alleged that the trial court erred
in not determining whether Mr. Moser was mentally competent on
the date he transferred the gift.50 The trial court did, however,
conclude that Mr. Moser was mentally competent on the date that
he executed the power of attorney, August 30, 1985.51 On review,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, declared that the trial
court had made no determination concerning Mr. Moser's compe-
tency on the critical date of the transaction at the bank.52 This
confused. Id. Confusion on her part, however, was determined not to be fraudulently in-
duced. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. See note 39 and accompanying text for direct testimony of DeSetta indicating
a degree of explanation to Mrs. Moser by the bank and by DeSetta. Id.
47. Id. The court cited Estate of Bosico, 488 Pa 274, 412 A2d 505, 506 (1980). Id.
Black's Law Dictionary defines "clear and convincing" proof as "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, more than a preponderance but less than is required in a criminal case. . . . Proof
which should leave no reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of facts concerning the
truth of the matters in issue." Black's Law Dictionary 227 (West, 5th 1979).
48. Moser, 589 A2d at 683. The court stated that it would be "unfortunate" if Mrs.
Moser signed away her interest in her life-savings without full comprehension of the conse-
quences attached to her actions. Id.
49. Id. The court relied on Sobel v Sobel, 435 Pa 80, 254 A2d 649, 651 (1969), where
the court declared:
Where mental competency is at issue, the real question is the condition of the person
at the very time he executed the instrument or made the gift in question . . . . [A]
person's mental capacity is best determined by his spoken words and his conduct,
and. . . the testimony of persons who observed such conduct on the date in question
out- ranks testimony as to observation made prior to and subsequent to that date.
Sobel, 254 A2d at 651.
50. Moser, 589 A2d at 683. The trial court focused solely on the date Mr. Moser
signed the power of attorney when determining the competency issue. Id. The trial court
gave considerable weight to the testimony of the attorney who assisted Mr. Moser in execut-
ing the power of attorney. Id. The attorney indicated that Mr. Moser appeared lucid and
understanding on September 16, 1985. Id. The trial court gave less weight to the physician's
testimony considering the physician examined Mr. Moser five months before and six weeks
after the power of attorney was executed. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id at 684. The court concluded that, although the validity of the power of attor-
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transaction was contested by Mrs. Moser.53 Because Mr. Moser was
acting on his own behalf that day and not using his power of attor-
ney, the supreme court remanded 4 the case to the court of com-
mon pleas to resolve the crucial factual issue of competency on the
day in question.5
In conclusion, the court agreed with the lower courts' opinions to
the extent that Mrs. Moser was not entitled to invalidate the bank
account transfer on the basis of undue influence or fraud.56 It was
determined, however, that the issue of Mr. Moser's competency on
September 16, 1985, had yet to be resolved by the trial court.
57
Justice Larsen filed what he referred to as a "vigorous dissent.
'58
The dissent stated that the issue raised on appeal was whether a
valid gift had been made by Mr. Moser when he transferred his
and his wife's life savings into a joint savings account bearing his
and Ethel Moser's names. 59 Justice Larsen concluded that the evi-
dence showed that Mr. Moser had been subjected to undue influ-
ence by DeSetta who stood in a confidential relationship" ° with
ney may have been necessary to resolve Mrs. Moser's other claims, it was not determinative
of the savings account transfer because Mr. Moser was acting in his own behalf with regard
to that transaction. Id.
53. Id at 683.
54. Black's Law Dictionary defines remand as: "The sending back by the appellate
court of the cause back to the same court out of which it came, for purpose of having some
further action taken ofi it there." Black's Law Dictionary 1162 (West, 5th ed 1979).
55. Moser, 589 A2d at 684.
56. Id. See notes 24-25 for definitions of undue influence and fraud.
57. Moser, 589 A2d at 684. Justice Papadakos concurred in the result, but filed no
opinion. Id. On remand the trial court held that competency on the date of the transfer is to
be presumed. The burden of proving otherwise is upon the person who seeks to invalidate
the gift. If there is evidence showing the lack of mental competency for periods of time
before and after the time of the transaction, then the burden shifts to the person who al-
leges that the transfer occurred when the donor was mentally competent. Mrs. Moser
presented competent evidence from Mr. Moser's physician to establish that Mr. Moser was
not mentally competent at times surrounding the transaction. Once this is established, the
burden of proof shifts to DeSetta, the donee. The trial court held that DeSetta failed to
meet this shifted burden of proof, Mr. Moser, therefore, was determined not to have suffi-
cient mental capacity on the date of the transaction. The transfer of the bank account to
DeSetta was not valid. Moser, No 105 (Pa Corn P1, Fayette Cty 1991).
58. Moser, 589 A2d at 684 (Larsen dissenting).
59. Id at 680. The elements for a valid gift of personal property are that: there must
be a donative intent, delivery and acceptance. Mr. Moser's donative intent is questioned due
to the unresolved issue of his mental competence on the date he made the transfer. Boyer,
Survey of the Law of Property at 710 (cited in note 19).
60. Moser, 589 A2d at 684. Black's Law Dictionary describes confidential relation as:
A fiduciary relation. It is a peculiar relationship which exists between . . . appointor
and appointee under powers. . .In these and like cases, the law, in order to prevent
undue advantage from the unlimited confidence or sense of duty which the relation
naturally creates, requires the utmost degree of good faith in all transactions between
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him on the date of the questioned transaction. Therefore, the
transaction was void. 1 The dissent restated the established doc-
trine that the burden of proof normally rests upon the party as-
serting that the transfer of property' was not a gift.62 Justice Larsen
concluded that the general principle would not apply where the
parties had a relationship to each other, or had a tainted interest
in connection with the transaction.s Where a prior relationship
between the parties was established, the recipient of the alleged
gift was compelled to show that the gift was a free, voluntary, and
intelligent act of the donor.6 4 This would effectively shift the bur-
den of proof in cases where a confidential relationship was proven
to have existed.
6 5
The dissent referred to the record to determine that DeSetta did
in fact have a confidential relationship with Mr. Moser, thus re-
quiring a shift of the burden of proof to DeSetta.6 Justice Larsen
found evidence of a confidential relationship based upon the pres-
ence of several factors.6 Foremost was the fact that DeSetta took
the parties.
Black's Law Dictionary 270 (West, 5th ed 1979).
61. Moser, 589 A2d at 684. The power of attorney was given by Mr. Moser to DeSetta
on August 30, 1985. The bank transaction in question occurred September 16, 1985. Id. Due
to facts later developed in the dissent, the creation of the power of attorney prior to the
transaction becomes critical.
62. Id. The general rule in Pennsylvania places the burden of proof that a transfer of
property was not a valid gift upon the party so asserting. The burden of proof must be met
by a production of evidence of a clear, strong and compelling nature. Dzierski Estate, 449
Pa 285, 296 A2d 716, 718 (1972).
63. Moser, 589 A2d at 684. If circumstances are such that it is clear that the parties
did not deal on equal terms, the burden of proof will shift to the donee. If an overmastering
of influence, or the other party demonstrated weakness or justifiable dependence or trust, a
burden shift would result. Dzierski, 296 A2d at 718.
64. Moser, 589 A2d at 685. The court determined that to establish a valid gift, the
evidence must come from a competent witness and also be clear, direct, precise, and con-
vincing evidence. Donsavage Estate, 420 Pa 587, 218 A2d 112, 118 (1985). For a discussion
of the dissenting opinion's consideration of DeSetta's burden, see notes 59-62 and accompa-
nying text.
65. Moser, 589 A2d at 685. See notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
66. Moser, 589 A2d at 685.
67. Id at 684-85. Justice Larsen summarized DeSetta's machinations: When Desetta
returned to Pennsylvania from Florida she immediately assumed control of Mr. Moser's life
and his financial affairs. DeSetta took Mr. Moser to her attorney to sign a power of attorney
that appointed DeSetta as his attorney-in-fact. DeSetta directed Mr. Moser to buy treasury
bills with the life-savings that he and his wife had amassed during thirty-seven years of
marriage. DeSetta displaced Mr. Moser from his home where he had lived with his wife for
their thirty-seven years together. Mr. Moser was moved into the family home of Ethel
Moser and DeSetta. DeSetta arranged for the treasury bills to be transferred into a joint
savings account bearing the names of Mr. Moser and their sister, Ethel Moser, for whom
DeSetta also served as attorney-in-fact. When Mr. Moser became too ill to be cared for in
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Mr. Moser to her own attorney to have him sign a power of attor-
ney appointing her attorney-in-fact for Mr. Moser.6 8 The fact that
DeSetta was attorney-in-fact for Mr. Moser and Ethel Moser si-
multaneously was thought by the dissent to be evidence that
DeSetta had received a benefit from the transfer. 9 Justice Larsen
concluded that DeSetta assumed and exercised absolute and total
control over Mr. Moser's personal and financial interests.
7 0
DeSetta, therefore, had the burden of proving that the gift was a
free, voluntary, and intelligent act of Mr. Moser.7'
The burden of proof rested upon DeSetta and she failed to pre-
sent any evidence as to Mr. Moser's competency to make a gift on
the transfer date. 2 DeSetta further failed to prove that Mr. Moser
was free from the exercise of undue influence at the time he made
the gift to her in September of 1985.73 Justice Larsen's dissent,
therefore, concluded that the gift was not a valid transfer.74
The concept of "gift" has long been an accepted part of Western
culture and law.7 5 At the beginning of the common law, protection
of a purported donor's interest in his property was strictly upheld;
inquiry into the transaction was maintained to ensure its "gift" na-
ture.7 6 This common law concern with one's property interest was
introduced to the English legal system through its Roman legal
her home, DeSetta removed him to a nursing home. DeSetta arranged for Mr. Moser to
change the beneficiary of his pension plan and life insurance from Mrs. Moser to DeSetta.
Immediately after Mr. Moser passed away, DeSetta substituted her name for his on the
joint savings account. Id.
68. Id at 685.
69. Id.
70. Id. See note 67 and accompanying text.
71. Moser, 589 A2d at 685; Donsavage Estate, 218 A2d at 112-18.
72. Moser, 589 A2d at 685; Donsavage Estate, 218 A2d at 118.
73. Moser, 589 A2d at 685. In his dissent, Justice Larsen also found that the facts
clearly established that DeSetta concealed material facts from Mrs. Moser amounting to
fraud. Justice Larsen continued by determining that the facts showed that Mrs. Moser was
not aware that she was transferring her interest in the couple's life-savings to Ethel Moser
until after the fact. In light of Mrs. Moser's advanced age, lack of financial savvy, and confu-
sion, it was DeSetta's responsibility to explain to Mrs. Moser the transaction and its conse-
quences in a full and complete manner. The dissent declared that DeSetta failed in that
responsibility. Id.
74. Id. See note 59 for the elements of a valid gift.
75. W. F. Finlason, Reeves' History of English Law 86 (Murphy, 1879).
76. Id. In the Thirteenth Century, during the reign of Henry III, a writ was required
mandating that the sheriff make an inquiry as to the capacity of the donor and donee to
determine if they had been capable of managing their affairs. Another writ was required to
validate the donor's seal on the charter. The law at this time also, provided that all gifts
should be made of free will and of the donor's own accord. If the donor was coerced or there
existed undue compulsion, the gift was revoked. Id.
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heritage.7
Blackstone, in his influential commentaries, defined the parame-
ters from which the claim of a gift was to be drawn.7" To be a valid
gift, the donor must have relinquished possession to the donee.79
Blackstone further stated that a gift was not properly made where
it was made to defraud creditors, or the donor was mentally inca-
pacitated, or the donor was taken in by false pretenses to make the
gift.80 Protection of a transferor's interest was, therefore, strictly
upheld."'
The history of the law as it pertains to gifts has been stable
throughout the centuries."2 The courts have been quick and firm in
their protection of the interests of transferors who have allegedly
become donors.83 During the infancy of Pennsylvania as a state of
the Union, case law was decided which indicated that Pennsylva-
nia would follow the common law tradition.
8 4
There are specific areas of concern expressed by the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court when considering inter vivos gifts.8 5 The court
has focused primarily upon three factors: (1) the mental compe-
77. Sir William Holdsworth, II A History of English Law 204-05 (Methuen & Co.
Ltd., 1st ed 1903, reprinted 1971).
78. William D. Lewis, 1 Lewis's Blackstone 895-97 (Bisel, 1922).
79. Lewis, Lewis's Blackstone at 896 (cited in note 78).
80. Id at 896-97.
A true and proper gift or grant is always accompanied with delivery of possession,
and takes effect immediately . . . and it is not in the donor's power to retract it,
though he did it without any consideration or recompense; unless it be prejudicial to
creditors; or the donor were under any legal incapacity, as infancy, coverture, duress,




82. Greenfield's Estate, 14 Pa St 489, 506-07 (1850). Where a gift is involved, the rule
is more stringent than if the transfer were by a contract or other arm's length transaction.
This area of law has been well-considered and well-settled. Id.
83. Appeal of Darlington, 147 Pa 624, 23 A 1046 (1892). An eighty-four year old
bachelor moved into his nephew's home. The bachelor signed a note to his nephew for
$7,000 a few months after having moved in with him. The elderly bachelor died thirteen
months later. The court held that the note was void based on constructive fraud springing
from the confidential relationship between the bachelor and his nephew. The court stated:
"To guard against the strong influences which these connections [elderly and caretaker] are
so apt to originate, the law not only watches over the transactions of the parties with great
and jealous scrutiny, but it often declares transactions absolutely void. ... " Darlington, 23
A at 1048.
84. Wistar's Appeal, 54 Pa St 60 (1867); Greenfield's Estate, 14 Pa St 489 (1850);
Appeal of Darlington, 23 A 1046 (1892).
85. An inter vivos gift has three requirements: (1) delivery, adequate to dispossess
the donor, (2) intent on the part of the donor to make a gift, and (3) the donee must accept.
Ray A. Brown, The Law of Personal Property 77-78 (Callaghan, 3d ed 1955).
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tency of the donor at the time the gift was made, (2) whether a
confidential relationship existed between the donor and the donee,
and (3) who has the burden of proof.8 6 This note will examine the
approach the court has taken to each of these areas. A survey of
Pennsylvania's case law reveals a considerably stable approach to
the issue of mental competency. Landis v Landis8 7 was one of the
first opportunities which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had to
develop law on donative transfers.88 The supreme court stated that
once mental incapacity has been established and proved, the bur-
den of proof shifts and those wishing to uphold the transaction
must prove the sufficiency of mental capacity of the transferor at
the time of the transaction in question. 9 This position was consis-
tent with the English common law, having its roots in Roman
Law.90 In 1870, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Hardin v
Hays,91 indicated that once a "general imbecility of mind" was
proved, the burden shifts to the party that had received the pur-
ported gift.92 The receiving party must prove that the transferor
executed the transaction during a period in which he was lucid and
that he also was capable of understanding the transaction.9 3 Build-
ing upon the earlier decisions, the court subsequently held that
having failing health and failing mental powers, coupled with a
change in personal financial philosophy, is adequate evidence to
conclude that the donor was mentally incompetent to make a gift
transaction. 4 In Stepp v Frampton,9 5 the supreme court upheld a
86. See Landis v Landis, 1 Grant Cas 248 (1885); Hardin v Hayes, 9 Pa 151 (1848);
Stepp v Frampton, 179 Pa 284, 36 A 177 (1897); In re Meyers, 410 Pa 455, 189 A2d 852
(1963); Sobel v Sobel, 435 Pa 80, 254 A2d 649 (1969); Girsh Trust, 410 Pa 455, 189 A2d 852
(1963); In re Estate of Clark, 461 Pa 52, 334 A2d 628 (1975).
87. 1 Grant Cas 248 (1855).
88. Landis, 1 Grant Cas at 248.
89. Id.
90. Holdsworth, II A History of English Law at 204-05 (cited in note 77).
91. 9 Pa 151, 162 (1848).
92. Hardin, 9 Pa at 162.
93. Id.
94. Stepp v Frampton, 179 Pa 284, 36 A 177, 178-79 (1897). In this case a seventy-
five year old man, who had been frugal throughout his years, began speculating wildly in the
oil business by giving money and land to a friend for that purpose. The court stated:
The man who during his long life, when his mind was strong, shunned such opera-
tions, now, when weakened by disease and age, and leaning on one in whom he con-
fided, made an absurdly disastrous bargain. All frauds perpetrated on the weak and
confiding are successful only because they are susceptible to influences which the or-
dinarily strong and self-reliant resist.
Stepp, 36 A at 179.
95. 179 Pa 284, 36 A 177 (1897).
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lower court decision which had canceled the transfer of land based,
in part, on the donor's lack of mental competency.96 The court de-
termined that once evidence had been produced by the donor or
his representative, which showed mental and physical infirmity
and a confidential relationship between the donor and donee, the
burden of proof then fell upon the donee.9" The donee was then
required to show that the transaction had been a voluntary act of
the donor. 8 A further element which had to be proved by the do-
nee was that the donor fully understood the ramifications of his
actions.99 If the donee failed in meeting his burden, the transaction
would fail.1"'
Other early cases indicated that Pennsylvania would protect a
mentally incompetent person from disposing of his possessions
without having a full understanding of the transaction. 0 1 The
transaction was also required to be a voluntary act of the trans-
feror, thus protecting him from undue influence.10 2 This early pro-
tection was manifested primarily by imposing the burden of proof
on the beneficiary of the transaction. 03 The beneficiary was forced
to prove the proper mental capacity of the donor at the time of the
gift.10
4
The treatment of proof of mental capacity under Pennsylvania
law remained quite stable as indicated by the 1963 supreme court
case In re Meyers."0 5 Meyers displays the consistency mental ca-
pacity law has maintained by stating that the initial burden of
proof is on the donor or his representative to show that the donor
lacked mental capacity in a general sense. 06 This practice was
designed to overcome the presumption of mental competency of a





101. See In re Meyers, 410 Pa 455, 189 A2d 852, 859 (1963); Hardin, 9 Pa 151 (1848);
Landis, 1 Grant Cas 248 (1885); Henes v McGovern, 317 Pa 302, 176 A 503 (1935); Stepp, 36
A 177 (1897).
102. Stepp, 36 A at 178.
103. Id; Harden, 9 Pa 151 (1848); Landis, 1 Grant Cas 248 (1885).
104. Stepp, 36 A 177 (1897); Harden, 9 Pa 151 (1848); Landis, 1 Grant Cas 248 (1885).
105. 410 Pa 455, 189 A2d 852 (1963).
106. Meyers, 189 A2d at 858. In this case the donees were able to prove that the donor
had been confined to mental institutions for twenty-one and one-half months out of thirty-
two and one-half months prior to the transfer. The donees further showed that the donor
was hospitalized in a mental institution for four years and three months beginning less than
six months after the transfer was effectuated. This general showing transferred the burden
of proof to the donor. Id.
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person who has made a transfer. 10 7 Once the donor has proven lack
of mental competence, the burden of proof shifts to the donee who
must show, by clear and convincing evidence, 10 8 that the donor had
been mentally competent at the time of the transaction. 09
The supreme court further developed mental capacity law in
Sobel v Sobel."0 In Sobel, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania up-
held the lower court decision which had denied a father's attempt
to revoke inter vivos gifts to his daughters." The supreme court
again held that mental competence at the time of the transaction
was determinative." 2 Finding that the burden of proof was cor-
rectly placed upon the father first, the court held that he had
failed to overcome the presumption of competency."' The court
further stated that even if the father had met his burden, the
daughters had effectively rebutted his mental competency claim."
4
The court relied heavily on the testimony of the attorney who had
been present at the time of the transfer."
15
The lone substantial development from the earliest Pennsylva-
nia cases to the present is the specifically enumerated presumption
in Patterson v Snider"6 that a donor is mentally competent." 7 Al-
though this standard may have been reasonably inferred from the
earlier cases, it was not until Patterson that the presumption had
107. Id.
108. See note 47 for a definition of clear and convincing evidence.
109. Meyers, 189 A2d at 858.
110. 435 Pa 80, 254 A2d 649 (1969).
111. Sobel, 254 A2d at 650. Sobel attempted to set aside gifts he had made to his three
minor daughters from whose mother he was divorced. Sobel delivered three checks to an
attorney and requested the attorney to set up irrevocable trusts for his daughters. The at-
torney complied with Sobel's wishes. Id.
112. Id at 651. The court cited Girsh Trust, 410 Pa 455, 189 A2d 852 (1963): "Where
mental competency is at issue, the real question is the condition of the person at the very
time he executed the instrument or made the gift in question." Sobel, 254 A2d at 651.
113. Sobel, 254 A2d at 651. See also Meyers, 189 A2d at 858.
114. Sobel, 254 A2d at 651.
115. Id. The Sobel court determined that the mental capacity of a donor at the time of
the transfer was more critical than periods of diminished capacity prior to and subsequent
to the time of the transfer. The court relied heavily on testimony of the attorney who was
present at the transfer, to the detriment of Sobel's psychiatrist's testimony. The psychiatrist
did not see Sobel on the day of the transfer. The court also determined the psychiatrist's
testimony to be equivocal and unconvincing with regard to Sobel's lack of capacity during
the periods surrounding the transactions. Sobel was not shown to be incapable of operating
his substantial business interests and no evidence was produced to overcome the presump-
tion of his mental competence. Id.
116. 305 Pa 272, 157 A 612 (1931).
117. Patterson, 157 A at 613.
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been definitively stated.118 The position enunciated in Patterson
effectively placed the burden of proof on the donor to produce gen-
eral evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of mental
competence. 119 Once established, the burden shifted to the donee
to show by clear and convincing evidence that the donor was men-
tally competent at the time of the transfer.12 It appears, therefore,
that the donor or his representative was not required to prove the
donor's lack of mental competency at the time of the transfer.
12
The donor need only produce evidence sufficient to indicate that
he had been mentally incompetent during periods prior to, and/or
subsequent to, the transaction. 2 2 It is then the donee's burden to
show competency at the specific time of the transfer.1
23
The second focus of analysis regarding a donor's capacity to
make a valid gift centered around the existence and impact of a
confidential relationship. 124 Pennsylvania has a long history of case
law considering confidential relationships and their impact on
transactions between the parties so situated. 25 In Worrall's Ap-
peal, 2 6 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was called upon to de-
cide the validity of a gift from a recently of-age, adult orphan to
his nurse of many years. 27 It was determined in Worrall that the
nurse had dominion 28 over the young man akin to that of a
mother over her son. 29 The court explained that where dominion
118. Id.
119. Id. Meyers, 189 A2d at 858.
120. Meyers, 189 A2d at 858.
121. Sobel, 254 A2d at 651.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See note 60 and accompanying text.
125. See Worrall's Appeal, 1 A 380 (1885); Darlington, 147 Pa 624, 23 A 1046 (1892);
Henes v McGovern, 317 Pa 302, 176 A 503 (1935); In re Estate of Clark, 461 Pa 52, 334 A2d
628 (1975); Stepp, 36 A at 179 ("But when the relations existing between the contracting
parties appear to be of such a character as to render it certain that they do not deal on
equal terms, but that on the one side . . . from overmastering influence, or on the other
side, from weakness, dependence, or trust justifiably reposed, unfair advantage in a transac-
tion is rendered probable, then the burden is shifted, and the transaction is presumed void;
and it is incumbent upon the party in whom such confidence is reposed to show affirma-
tively that no deception was used, and that all was fair, open, voluntary, and well under-
stood. This principle is of very general application,... and the courts have always been
careful not to fetter this useful jurisdiction by defining the exact limits of its exercise").
126. 1 A 380 (1885).
127. Worrall's Appeal, 1 A at 380.
128. Dominion is defined as "a supremacy in determining and directing the actions of
others or in governing politically, socially, or personally." Webster's Third New Interna-
tional Dictionary 672 (Merriam-Webster, 1986).
129. In Worrall's Appeal, a twenty-one year old young man gave his nurse real estate
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is found to exist, there is a presumption against the validity of a
gift between the parties and if the exercised dominion is complete,
the law would prohibit a gift during the continuance of
dominion. 1 0
The court in Worrall further explained the concept of undue in-
fluence in the garnering of a gift.131 The case reinforced the princi-
ple that the courts presumed undue influence where a confidential
relationship existed.13 2 The burden of proof was then placed upon
the person claiming the gift.
133
An influential early Pennsylvania Supreme Court case, Boyd v
Boyd,1 34 established a six-pronged test to determine if sufficient
evidence existed to give rise to a presumption of undue influence
by the donee on the donor.135 The test, which was used for almost
eighty years, required that the evidence demonstrate: (1) bodily in-
firmity, (2) the donor's substantially weakened mental capacity, (3)
that the donee was a stranger to the blood of the donor, (4) that
the donee was standing in a confidential relationship with the do-
nor, and (5) the donee was benefitted by a will (6) which he had
worth $15,000 for the nominal consideration of $15. The nurse had cared for the young man
since his mother had died when he was five years old. The boy's father died when the boy
turned nineteen and the nurse was thereafter his closest "family member." The lad had
always been quite sickly and did not anticipate a long life. When the young man reached the
age of twenty-one he wanted to compensate his nurse for all the years she had been in his
service. He consulted the executor of his father's estate who approved of the gift. The trial
court found that the young man and nurse stood in relation of a parent and child, thus
creating a prima facia case of constructive fraud or undue influence. The prima facia undue
influence placed the burden of proof on the donee to show that the transaction was fair and
well thought out. Worrall's Appeal, 1 A at 381-85.
130. Id at 388. Confidential relationships, with respect to dominion, have been found
to exist in the relation of parent and child when the child has recently reached majority,
between the child and parent when the parent is subject to the will of the child due to old
age or feebleness, and to various similar relationships like uncle and niece. Id.
131. Id at 386. In Worrall's Appeal, the court concluded that the nurse failed to pro-
duce sufficient evidence to show that the transaction was fair and that the real estate was
transferred without benefit of undue influence. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id at 386-87. In an informational summary of citations, the Worrall's Appeal
court stated that, "As a general rule the burden of proof is on the person alleging the undue
influence.. . . It may be shown by circumstantial evidence, and the relation of the parties."
Id at 387. Direct proof of undue influence is not required; it may be shown by circumstantial
evidence. Once a confidential relationship is shown, however, undue influence is presumed
and the burden is placed upon the donee. Id.
134. 66 Pa 283 (1870).
135. Boyd, 66 Pa at 293-94. See also Wilson v Mitchell, 101 Pa 495 (1882). The six-
pronged test is not specifically enumerated. However, it can be deduced through the cases
that the courts are using this type of test. Id.
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been instrumental in writing.13 6
Simultaneously with the Boyd test, a three-pronged test
designed to demonstrate the existence of a confidential relation-
ship was affirmatively stated in Cuthbertson's Appeal.3 7 The
Cuthbertson test was considered to be more attuned to the times
than the six-pronged Boyd test.138 A confidential relationship was
of a degree substantial enough to be considered unduly influential
if: (1) a person stands in a confidential relationship and (2) re-
ceives the bulk of the donor's property (3) from a donor of weak-
ened intellect.3 9 The burden of proof would then be placed upon
the donee who occupies the confidential relation to prove affirma-
tively the absence of undue influence.'
40
In 1975, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in In re Estate of
Clark,' outlined the test that would be utilized under modern
Pennsylvania law.' 42 The court also specified the presumptions
which would be created by fulfillment of the test factors. 43 Penn-
sylvania was to favor the three-pronged test of Cuthbertson.4 4 The
consequence of establishing the test factors would be to shift the
burden of proof to the donee to affirmatively disprove undue influ-
ence. 145 Once the donor has established the presumption and
shifted the burden to the donee, the donee is compelled to produce
clear and convincing evidence which affirmatively demonstrates
the absence of undue influence.
46
136. Clark, 334 A2d at 632. Although the Boyd test is designed to determine undue
influence as it pertains to wills, subsequent courts have used the test to determine whether
undue influence was a factor in other types of transactions including gifts. Id.
137. 97 Pa 163 (1881).
138. Clark, 334 A2d at 632.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 461 Pa 52, 334 A2d 628 (1975).
142. Id. Mrs. Clark, seventy-seven years old, was diagnosed as suffering from cerebral
arteriosclerosis ten months prior to effecting the transfer of stocks valued at $21,500 to a
friend. The Clark court invalidated the gift, basing its decision on undue influence rather
than lack of mental competence, stating:
Weakened mentality... need not amount to testamentary incapacity. Undue influ-
ence is generally accomplished by a gradual, progressive inculcation of a receptive
mind. The 'fruits' of the undue influence may not appear until long after the weak-
ened intellect has been played upon. In other words, the particular mental condition
of the testatrix on the date she executed the will is not as significant when reflecting
upon undue influence as it is when reflecting upon testamentary capacity.
Id at 633-34.






In Clark, the supreme court has clearly and decisively set forth
the standard to be used in Pennsylvania for cases dealing with con-
fidential relationships and the corresponding consequence of un-
due influence. 147 Pennsylvania now requires a showing of a confi-
dential relationship between the donor and the donee coupled with
the weakened intellect of the donor.1 48 There is one additional re-
quirement for a donor to prove his prima facia case of undue influ-
ence: the donor must show that the donee substantially benefitted
from the transaction.
1 49
When viewed in conjunction with established Pennsylvania case
law, the Moser decision further entrenched a long-standing tradi-
tion in Pennsylvania case law. The earlier cases of Meyers and
Sobel had established the initial principle that one who had made
an inter vivos gift was mentally competent to do so. Moser main-
tained the consistency this area of law had embraced by following
earlier decisions which held that the burden was initially placed
upon the donor. The donor or his representative was required to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the donor was not
mentally competent either at the time of the transaction, or during
periods prior to and/or subsequent to the transaction.150 Once this
had been established by the donor, the burden shifted to the donee
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the donor was men-
tally competent at the time of the transfer. 51 Moser does not at-
tack this principle. By allowing the donor to shift the burden to
the donee, the supreme court reinforced centuries of case law that
had vigorously protected the property rights of a donor.
Although the majority's decision in Moser did not specifically
delineate either the six-pronged test or the three-pronged test, the
majority used an integral factor of both tests to determine that
DeSetta was not in a confidential relationship with Mr. Moser. The
majority, therefore, concluded that there was no valid basis for a
claim of undue influence.'52 This determination was based upon
two factors. First, DeSetta did not obtain an interest in Mr.
Moser's bank account until after his death.15 3 Second, there was no
evidence presented that she had acted pursuant to a belief that the
147. Id at 631-34.
148. Id at 632.
149. Id.
150. Worrall's Appeal, 1 A at 386-87. See also note 27.
151. Worrall's Appeal, 1 A at 386-87. See also Clark, 334 A2d at 632.




funds would be transferred to her after Mr. Moser's death.154 The
majority placed great importance upon the fact that DeSetta did
not directly benefit from the transfer of Mr. Moser's savings ac-
count to Ethel Moser. Justice Larsen's dissent emphasized all of
the surrounding factors and coupled those with DeSetta's indirect
access to the savings to determine that a confidential relationship
had existed. By so concluding, Justice Larsen would have held that
the transfer to Ethel Moser was invalid because DeSetta, who had
an interest in the transfer, maintained a confidential relationship
with Mr. Moser, the donor.155 This conclusion would have, in ef-
fect, returned the funds to Mrs. Moser.
Justice Larsen's dissent in Moser focused upon what he deter-
mined to have been a confidential relationship between Mr. Moser
and DeSetta, his sister.156 Justice Larsen believed that this confi-
dential relationship resulted in DeSetta having exerted undue in-
fluence on Mr. Moser. 57 Justice Larsen did not directly use the
six-pronged test of Boyd or the three-pronged test of Cuthbertson.
He did, however, base his decision upon controlling factors of those
tests: (1) DeSetta took Mr. Moser to her own attorney to have Mr.
Moser appoint her as his attorney-in-fact, (2) Mr. Moser and his
sister, Ethel Moser, had both appointed DeSetta as their attorney-
in-fact, (3) Mr. Moser transferred his savings to a joint account
with Ethel, allowing DeSetta indirect access to the account, thus
benefitting DeSetta, (4) There was unrebutted evidence that Mr.
Moser had a weakened mental capacity at the time surrounding
the transfer, and (5) DeSetta assumed and exercised absolute and
total control over Mr. Moser's personal and financial interests.
58
Once Justice Larsen reached the conclusion that a confidential re-
lationship had existed, he followed the well-established precedent
of earlier Pennsylvania cases by shifting the burden of proof to the
donee, DeSetta. DeSetta was then burdened with proving that the
gift was a "free, voluntary and intelligent act" of Mr. Moser.1
59
Although the majority decision, focusing on mental .competency,
was sound, it does not dispose of the conflict as expeditiously as
does the dissenting opinion. The majority opted for the more cer-
154. Id.
155. Id at 685.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id at 684-85. For a discussion of the three- and six-pronged tests, see notes 134-40
and accompanying text.
159. Moser, 589 A2d at 685.
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tain standard of mental competency on the date of the transaction.
Justice Larsen, in his dissent, assumed a somewhat more activist
role and opted for the less-defined test of confidential relationship
and undue influence. The failure of the majority to have concluded
that a confidential relationship existed appears to be unfounded,
or at least too narrowly focused, when compared to the overwhelm-
ing circumstances of the Moser case.
Kelly Cottrill

